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PATENT LAW REFORM VIA THE FEDERAL COURTS
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1982: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF PATENTABILITY JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION
T HE FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT' was signed into law on April 2,
1982. Set for an effective date of October 1, 1982, the result of this
enactment has been the merger of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
and the Court of Claims into a new appellate federal court: the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.2 Unlike most appellate courts, the jurisdiction of the
new Federal Circuit is determined primarily by subject matter, rather than
geography. 3 As a result, this change in the federal judiciary will be felt directly
in only a few special legal subject areas. Among these, the field of patent law
is feeling perhaps the greatest impact, beginning a new era which Congress in-
tended to begin with the Patent Act of 1952."
I. THE FEDERAL COURTS IMPROVEMENT ACT
The initial impetus for the Federal Courts Improvement Act was concern
over the ability of the appellate level federal courts to handle the alarming in-
crease in cases.5 The first organization to act on this concern was the Federal
Judicial Center ("Center"). 6 The Center, charged with the responsibility "to
further the development and adoption of improved judicial administration in
the courts of the United States," 7 appointed a committee of seven scholars
and lawyers headed by Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund to study the
caseload of the Supreme Court. The "Freund Report," submitted in December,
1972, recommended the establishment of a national court of appeals to con-
'Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 24 (1982).
2See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981).
'28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (West Supp. 1983) provides in part:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction - (1)
of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States ... if the jurisdiction
of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title [which confers original
jurisdiction on the district courts over all civil actions arising under any Act of Congress relatng
to patents, inter alia].
'Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982); 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1-293 (1982)).
'See Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts, Improvement Act of 1982 - And Beyond,
32 AM. U.L. REV. 543, 544 (1983).
'The Center was created by the Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 665 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 620-28. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
'28 U.S.C. § 620(a) (1976).
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duct a screening of petitions for review, thereby reducing the Supreme Court
caseload.' The national court of appeals was to be interposed between the
existing federal circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, adding a level
to the federal judicial hierarchy.9
After the appointment of the Freund Committee, but before the submission
of its report, Congress established the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System.'" This created the second organization which would
concern itself with the appellate caseload. Known as the "Hruska Commis-
sion," this body submitted its final report in June, 1975. " Although the Hruska
Commission focused more on the federal appellate courts, it too recommend-
ed the creation of a national appellate court. However, the Hruska Commis-
sion recommended a new court to play an ancillary role to the circuit courts
and the Supreme Court, receiving transfer cases from each,' 2 rather than a court
to be interposed as an additional layer of the hierarchy to screen the Supreme
Court. While the recommendations of neither the Freund Committee nor the
Hruska Commission were adopted by Congress, they established a framework
for the subsequent debate which ultimately led to the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982.1'
In the course of the dialogue on alteration of the federal courts, incentive
for change seemed focused at the circuit court level. '" In the months following
the Hruska Commission report; there was general agreement that the existing
proposals for sweeping revision would not necessarily satisfy the overriding
need to relieve the flow of cases to the federal appellate courts. Problems not
satisfactorily cured by either the Freund or Hruska proposal included the overly
burdensome caseload and the inability of the system to provide timely adjudica-
tion of issues of national law.'" Eventually, the Justice Department issued
a report on July 21, 1978 entitled "A Proposal to Improve the Federal Appellate
System."' 6 This report was later forwarded to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary where it became the focal point of the developing legislation later
enacted by Congress. 17
'See Federal Judicial Center, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1982), reported in 57 F.R.D. 573, 595 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND REPORT].
'See generally FREUND REPORT, supra note 8, at 590-95.
"Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. See Petrowitz, supra note 5, at 545 n.20.
'See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reported in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as HRUSKA REPORT].
"Id. at 236-47. See also Petrowitz, supra note 5, at 546.
"Petrowitz, supra note 5, at 544-50.
"Id. at 546.
'Id. at 549.
'Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, A PROPOSAL TO
IMPROVE THE FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM (July 21, 1978) (draft report) [hereinafter cited as PROPSAL].
See also Petrowitz, supra note 5, at 550. Id. at 550.
"See Petrowitz, supra note 5, at 551.
[Vol. 17:3
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By the time the Federal Courts Improvement Act was passed, it was clear
thatrelief from burdensome caseloads was not the sole purpose of the legisla-
tion. An equally important purpose was improvement of the timely adjudica-
tion of issues of national law.' Patent law was one of several areas frequently
cited by congressional committee reports as ripe for resolution of doctrinal con-
flicts among the federal circuit courts. '9 The legislative history is replete with
testimony concerning rampant "forum shopping" among patent litigants.20 As
a result, the proponents of the legislation strongly advocated one recommen-
dation common to both the Hruska Report and the Department of Justice
Proposal.2' The new court was given exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals in
patent-related cases. 22
Even before the legislation became effective, patent commentators were
developing predictions of the course that the new circuit court would take on
resolution of patent issues then in conflict among the several circuits.23 The
new court was expected to have a profound effect on the field of patent law.
Since then most practitioners have quickly come to view the new Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the ultimate source of law in patent-related
cases. They have reached that conclusion both because of the volume of cases
the court will hear, and because the Supreme Court is unlikely to alter whatever
doctrinal stance the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may adopt. 24
The Supreme Court might be expected to defer generally to the Federal Cir-
cuit's opinion on patent law issues25 in order to effectuate the purpose of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court
finds itself in disagreement with a position adopted by the Federal Circuit, it
is unlikely the Court could find the time to hear the cases necessary to divert
a trend. If the Supreme Court were to intervene, the present justices of the
Federal Circuit might attempt to side-step the Supreme Court pronouncement
"See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 11 (1981)
which states:
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to resolve some of the myriad structural administrative
and procedural problems that have impaired the ability of our Federal courts to deal with the vast
range of controversies among our citizens and to respond promptly and meaningfully to their demand
for justice. Those problems - which include the inability of our present system to provide a prompt,
definitive answer to legal questions of nationwide significant - have long been debated by legislators,
judges, lawyers, legal scholars, and those members of the general public concerned with the
administration of the Federal justice system.
"See, e.g., 67 F.R.D. 195, 297, 321 (1975).
"See, e.g., The Federal Courts Improvement Act: Hearings on S.21 and S.537 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1981).
"See Petrowitz, supra note 5, at 553.
2228 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a) (West Supp. 1983).
"See, e.g., The Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, (May 25, 1982), reported in 94 F.R.D. 347, 350 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ninth Judicial
Conference].
14See, Petrowitz, supra note 5, at 557: "It seems safe to predict that few of the new court's decisions
will reach the Supreme Court because of the consistency that should result from decisions of the Federal
Circuit." Id.
"Cf. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEWS (1981).
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as they have been known to do in the past.2 6
On October 1, 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit celebrated
its first birthday. During its brief existence the court has had occasion to address
many of the issues previously in conflict among the circuits and to foreshadow
a new era in patent law. The court's impact has been profound yet not altogether
surprising, considering that the die was cast for this new era over thirty years ago.
II. PATENT LAW
A. Introduction
For centuries, the laws of Western civilizations haverecognized the unique
attributes of novel ideas.27 As with ownership of land or other property, the
originator of a novel idea has the power to exclude others from its enjoyment
by remaining silent. However, unlike tangible property, once an idea has been
passed to another the owner's dominion over that idea can never totally be
restored. The idea can be passed from person to person, rapidly stripping its
orignator of any benefit.
Western civilizations also have long recognized the potential benefit to
society which can result from recognition of property interests in novel ideas.2"
Understanding of this effect led to the enactment of one of the earliest patent
laws around the year 1400 by the City of Venice. 9 Lawmakers of Venice
apparently believed that talented people could be attracted to their city and
contribute to its welfare if the laws empowered those people to exercise some
ownership control over their ideas.30 Since that time, most industrialized nations,
including communist countries, have accepted the belief that some grant of
limited legal protection by the sovereign over ideas encourages the generation
and disclosure of ideas and benefits society.
The laws surrounding patent protection of ideas generally have been the
product of three competing interests. First, there is a sense that an individual
who originates and perfects an idea has some "natural right" to ownership
of that idea which should be recognized by society.I' Second, there is the belief
underlying the early Venice statute and still pervasive today that the granting
of exclusive ownership rights over developed ideas will provide incentive and
2 See, e.g., Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), which the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to
the C.C.P.A., only to have the C.C.P.A. adhere to its original position on remand. Application of Bergy,
563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
"See generally R. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 66-69 (2d ed. 1981).
28ld.
29Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. Aoc'v. 166, 169 (1948).
3 See id.
'This sentiment is evidenced by the following quote taken from a 1559 petition by Giacopo Aconto to
Britain's Queen Elizabeth: "[N]othing is more honest than that those who by searching have found out
things useful to the public should have some of the fruits of their rights and labors, as meanwhile they
abandon all other modes of gain, are at much expense in experiments and often sustain much loss." R.
CHOTE & W. FRANCIS, supra note 26, at 69. See also Frederico, Origin and Early History of Patents,
II J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 292 (1929).
[Vol. 17:3
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stimulate productive effort to the benefit of society.32 Third, there is the con-
trasting belief that free market societies suffer an output constraint to the
detriment of the society wherever there exists exclusive control or monopolies,
such as those which patents create. 33
B. United States Patent Laws and Patentability Requirements
In apparent acknowledgment of both the natural right and the societal
benefit rationales for patent laws, the framers of the United States Constitu-
tion adopted clause 8 of section 8 of Article I, which provides that "[T]he Con-
gress shall have power . .. [T]o promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries."I" The constitutional history discloses
no debate on this clause." However, James Madison's writings in The Federalist,
No. 43, establish that the natural right and societal benefit rationales were the
basis for its adoption. 6
A bill aimed at exercising that constitutionally conferred power was intro-
duced in the first session of the first Congress and passed in the second session. 7
Under that statute, enacted on April 10, 1790, a patent was available for
"useful" inventions or discoveries "not before known or used."'" In 1793,
a new statute repealed the 1790 statute and replaced it with a statute allowing
patent availability for "new and useful" inventions "not known or used before
the application." 39 This statutory standard for patentability remained virtually
unchanged for the next 159 years.40 Nonetheless, the actual standard applied
by courts during that same period varied greatly.'
Even in the three brief years between the first patent acts, it was evident
to Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State and Patent Examiner, that a higher
standard of patentability was needed than the mere novelty and utility re-
quirements of the statute. 2 Under these standards, trivial advances were entitled
"See Mandich, supra note 29.
"See generally Stedman, Patents and Antitrust - The Impact of Varying Legal Doctrines, 1973 UTAH
L. REV. 588.
"U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
"1R. CHOATE & W. FRANCIS, supra note 27, at 74.
"Id. at 74. Madison stated:
The utility of [the Constitutional] clause will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at Common Law. The right to useful
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in
both cases with the claims of individuals.
Id.
37Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y. 59-60 (1936).
"An Act to promote the progress of Useful Arts, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
"I Stat. 318, Feb. 21, 1793.
"'The next substantial change to the statutory standard of patentability occurred with the Patent Act of 1952.
4'See generally Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y.
237 (1967).
"See Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words - Is Evolution in Legal Thinking Impossible?, 60 J. PAT.
Ov. SOc,'. 271, 287 (1978).
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to patent protection. This problem worsened as the pace of technological ad-
vance quickened, as revealed in the following language from an 1826 opinion:
The most frivolous and useless alterations in articles in common use are
denominated improvements, and made pretexts for increasing their prices,
while all complaint and remonstrants are effectually resisted by an ex-
hibition of the great seal. Implements and utensils, as old as the civiliza-
tion of man, are daily, by means of some ingeneous artifice, converted
into subjects for patents. If they have usually been made straight, some
man of genius will have them made crooked, and, in the phraseology of
the privileged order, will swear out a patent. 3
In response to the need for a higher patentability standard, the judiciary
sought to supplement the novelty and utility requirements enumerated in the
patent statutes. It did this through the use of a variety of vague and often in-
consistent concepts aasserted either as an over-arching constitutional limita-
tion or, more commonly, as a judicial construction of "invention.'" The emerg-
ing doctrines required that a device contain a "new principle" or exhibit a "new
result or new function" in order to be patented."5 Other cases required that
the change over previous knowledge be "nonobvious" or occur in a "flash
of creative genius."" Though most of these supplemental tests of patentability
were couched in terms of an "invention" requirement during this entire 159
year period, no one seemed to know for sure what the "invention" standard
meant.4 7 The Supreme Court stated in 1891:
The truth is, the word [invention] cannot be defined in such a manner
as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device
involves exercise of the inventive faculty or not. In a given case, we may
be able to say that there is present invention of a very high order. In another
we can see that there is lacking that impalpable something which
distinguishes invention from simple mechanical skill."'
A possible explanation for the judiciary's confusion during the years 1793
to 1952 on the judge-made supplemental patentability requirement is the incom-
patability between the necessary parameters of substantive patent law and the
competing interests which underlie patent law. In simple terms, the nature of
any patent system can be viewed as a difficult economic problem of tradeoffs
between incentive effects and output-constraining monopoly effects.4 9 Never-
theless, to avoid a logistically impossible case-by-case evaluation of these com-
peting economic interests with each patent application, a viable patent system
"'Thompson v. Haight, 23 Fed. Cas. 1040, 41 (No. 13,957) (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1826).
"'See generally Kitch, supra note 41, at 237.
"Id. at 262, 273.
"6Id. at 245-26.
"See it. at 240-41, 268-77.
4'McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
"See Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 282 (1977).
[Vol. 17:3
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must develop some set of working concepts for differentiating between
patentable and unpatentable inventions so as to maintain an appropriate balance
between the economic interests. Under the Patent Act of 179350 the concepts
were "novelty" and "utility"; the judiciary added "invention." In effect, a
patent law system is forced to use attributes of the invention or attributes of
the process leading to the invention as a proxy for the balancing of economic
arguments.
In the years from 1793 to the middle 1900's, anti-monopolist sentiment
in the United States varied.5 As these political-economic sentiments varied,
the judiciary's perception of a proper equilibrium point between the incentive
effects and the output constraining effects of the patent system also varied.
However, because the judiciary was forced to use invention attributes as a proxy
for its sense of an economic equilibrium, a consistent standard of patentability
was analytically impossible to achieve. This complication, combined with the
inevitable tendency to evaluate the worthiness of the invention, may have been
the source of the judiciary's inconsistency on the patentability standard.
With the history of the judiciary's "invention" requirement in mind, Con-
gress set out in 1950 to modestly revise and codify the patent laws.52 The revisers
determined that the third judge-made requirement for patentability should be
codified. They decided that the term commonly used by the courts - "inven-
tion" - should be avoided due to its ambiguity and inconsistent usage. "3 In-
stead, the drafters settled on the language in Section 103, requiring non-
obviousness. This section was added "for uniformity and definiteness' and to
provide "a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared
in some cases." 5
Despite this major innovation, the 1952 Patent Act was not entirely ef-
fective at establishing a consistent patentability standard. As recently as 1978,
appellate court justices have continued to perceive the existence of an "inven-
tion" requirement." Similarly, the language of the few Supreme Court cases
decided on the patentability issue since 1952 has occasionally slipped back into
the previous "invention" rut.56 Furthermore, language in Supreme Court cases
since that time regarding "combination patents" and "synergism" have led
federal district and appellate courts to occasionally adopt these concepts as
"Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
"See Kitch, supra note 41, at 270-72.
"See generally Lutz, The New 1952 Patent Statute, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y. 155 (1953).
"Rich, supra note 42, at 271.
"4H. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1952).
"See, e.g., Edwards, That Clumsy Word "Nonobviousness, " 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 3 (1978). Judge
Edwards of the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals states: "The requirement of invention for patentability
is alive and well in the Supreme Court of the United States, and as a consequence, in all of the federal
courts - and the Patent Office." Id. at 12.
"Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
COMMENTSWinter, 19841
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requirements of patentability in addition to the statutory requirements.57
The 1952 Patent Act's failure to put an end to judge-made supplemental
requirements for patentability may be attributable to several factors. Perhaps
the greatest of these is the Supreme Court's apparent willingness in this and
many other areas of law to inject its own policy judgment into statutory and
constitutional construction. Rather than accept the patentability standards of
novelty, utility and nonobviousness established by Congress as a reasonable
proxy for a satisfactory economic equilibrium between the incentive effects and
the output constraining effects of the patent system, the Supreme Court occa-
sionally wanders beyond the literal language of the statutes, apparently guided
by its own sense of the proper boundaries on patentability. The infrequency
of Supreme Court decisions in this area compounds this effect. The Supreme
Court's apparent reluctance to hear patentability cases has allowed the appellate
courts to read undue meaning into its decisions in this area since 1952.8
Against this background of confusion, Congress formed the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Despite Congress' attempt in 1952 to stabilize
patent law, particularly on the patentability standard, the confusion was as
great in 1982 as in nearly any time since 1793. Many conflicts among the cir-
cuit courts were ripe for resolution.
III. RESOLUTION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
OF ISSUES RELATING TO THE SECTION 102 PATENTABILITY
REQUIREMENT OF THE PATENT ACT OF 1952
A. Introduction
The patent law issues in conflict among the circuits most frequently cited
as ripe for resolution by the new court were those controversial issues arising
under the nonobviousness requirement of the statute, added in 1952.11 That
code section provides as one of the conditions for patentability that the inven-
tion must not have been obvious at the time it was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the discipline related to the invention.6" The Supreme Court
first construed this statutory provision fifteen years after its enactment in
Graham v. John Deere Co.6'
"See, e.g., Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57. See also Roanwell Corp.
v. Plantronics Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1004-11 (1977). (White, J., dissenting).
"See Rich, supra note 42, at 296-301: "One can therefore conclude that the Supreme Court routinely
chooses not to interfere in the administration of the patent law by the Circuit Courts .... Over the past
12 years, the Supreme Court has averaged less than I patent case in 2 years." Id. at 301.
5935 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
-"35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) provides in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described
as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
"'383 U.S. 1 (1966).
[Vol. 17:3
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In deciding Graham, the Supreme Court recounted the history of patent
law development under the constitutional provision.62 The Court explained that
between 1790 and 1950 the Patent Act had contained statutory requirements
only of "novelty" and "utility." In the Court's view the Patent Act had deferred
to the courts during that period for development of additional conditions to
patentability where necessary.63 The Court stated that the nonobviousness re-
quirement added by the 1952 Patent Act represented a codification of the prior
judge-made requirement of "invention" first developed in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood.6" The Court concluded that the judge-made standard for patent-
ability had not been altered in any way by this codification, and that the statutory
emphasis on "non-obviousness" rather than "invention" was intended to correct
the wide variance of interpretation of the less definite Hotchkiss5 "invention"
standard. The Court approved of the change of emphasis to a nonobviousness
inquiry, stating that it would permit a more practical test of patentability, and
went on to make the following statement:
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the §
103 condition, which is but one of three conditions, each of which must
be satisfied, lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103,
the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art are resolved. Against this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long-
felt but unresolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give
light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these
inquiries may have relevancy.
This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in
applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious is not a question upon
which there is likely to be uniformity of thought in every given factual
context. The difficulties, however, are comparable to those encountered
daily by the courts in such frames of reference as negligence and scienter,
and should be amenable to a case-by-case development. We believe that
strict observance of the requirements laid down here will result in that
uniformity and definiteness which Congress called for in the 1952 Act.(cita-
tions omitted).66
The court then applied this analysis to the facts of the case and held the patent
invalid for obviousness.
62U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6'Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-10.
"52 U.S. (11 How.) 683 (1850).
"Graham, 383 U.S. at 14-17.
"Id. at 17-18.
Winter, 19841 COMMENTS
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B. The Conflicts Among the Circuit Courts
1. Origins of the Conflicts
The Section 103 nonobviousness prerequisite to patentability is the focal
point of the three most litigated issues in conflict among the circuits in recent
years. 67 The above quote was the source of two of the three issues. They are:
(1) whether the section 103 nonobviousness requirement is a question of fact
or a question of law under the Graham analysis, and (2) whether reference
to the so-called "secondary considerations" mentioned by the Graham Court
is required or optional in determining nonobviousness.
The third of the major patent issues in conflict under Section 103 arose
in a Supreme Court decision three years after Graham in Anderson's-Black
Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. 68 In that case, the validity of a patent
on an item consisting of a combination of known devices was challenged. The
patentee had combined existing devices to create an improved asphalt paving
apparatus. The Court held the patent invalid stating, among other things:
Each of the elements combined in the patent was known in the prior
art ....
... The combination of putting the burner together with the other
elements in one machine, though perhaps a matter of great convenience,
did not produce a "new or different function," within the test of validity
of combination patents ....
We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed
a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and quality of the radiant-
heat burner already patented. We conclude further that to those skilled
in the art the use of the old elements in combination was not an inven-
tion by the obvious-nonobvious standard. Use of the radiant-heat burner
in this important field marked a successful venture. But as noted, more
than that is needed for invention.
A combination of elements may result in an effect greater than the
sum of the several effects taken separately. No such synergistic result is
argued here . . . .(citations omitted). 9
This segment of the Court's opinion went far toward undoing the 1952 Patent
Act and the dissertation in Graham. Even those federal courts which had
previously abandoned the decades of traditional judge-made supplements in
favor of the statutory patentability requirements were thrown back into a rut.
This language gave rise to a perceived requirement, in the case of "combina-
tion patents," for "synergism." Thus, the third controversial issue under Section
"Goldstein, Conflicting Rules of Patent Law Within the Federal Judicial System, 12 INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 135, 136 (1980).
"8396 U.S. 57 (1969).
"Id. at 59-64.
[Vol. 17:3
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss3/8
103 awaiting resolution by the new court was whether "synergism" is required
of a "combination patent" in order to meet the nonobviousness prerequisite
to patentability.
The fact that each of the above three issues have been hotly debated since
Graham is not surprising, considering their significance in patent litigation.
The question of whether or not synergism is a requirement for patentability
is of great interest to litigants on both sides in any particular patent infringe-
ment suit. Synergism is an elusive concept, difficult to prove, and it can easily
be employed to defeat an opponent's patent.
Similarly, the "secondary considerations" can play an important role in
patent litigation. A patentee, for example, may often have strong evidence of
commercial success, although the patented invention may appear obvious in
hindsight to a judge or jury. In such a situation, the case of the patentee in
an infringement suit would be benefited greatly by a determination that secon-
dary considerations are always to be examined - a determination to be con-
trasted with the view that secondary considerations are to be examined only
if the three step Graham analysis of obviousness is equivocal.
The third issue, whether nonobviousness is a question of law or fact, has
great impact on the scope of review of the trial court's ruling. Even before
the Supreme Court's language referring to "basic factual inquiries" in the
Graham case,7" federal courts applying Section 103 had addressed this thorny
question concerning law and fact.' Yet, Graham did little to resolve the issue
and subsequent circuit court cases have gone both ways.72
Speculation regarding the outcome of these issues under the new court
flourished among patent law observers. Observers wondered how the Federal
Circuit would interpret the Supreme Court's apparent construction of Section
103.73 While forcasting the likely direction of the Federal Circuit on these issues
involved some uncertainty before the new court was installed, that uncertainty
diminished shortly after formation of the Federal Circuit. In one of its first
decisions, South Corp. v. United States,7 ' the newly formed Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit announced that the holdings of its predecessor courts,
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, would
be binding precedent on the Federal Circuit. With this, the outcome of the
"nonobviousness" issue became more certain since the predecessor opinions
were in harmony on the synergism and secondary considerations issues."
"Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
'See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1960).
"Goldstein, supra note 67, at 138.
"Since Graham, the Supreme Court has decided three § 103 cases: Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement
Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425
U.S. 273 (1976).
'-690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
"See Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23, at 423.
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However, uncertainty remained regarding the question of fact or law issue,
since the Court of Claims had been in conflict on that issue with the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals.7 6 Patent law practitioners eagerly awaited
ultimate resolution by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
2. Whether "Synergism" Is A Condition Of Patentability
As noted above, the notion of a synergism requirement had its origin in
Anderson's-Black Rock. It was reinforced by later Supreme Court language
in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. " Several circuits have adopted synergism as a prere-
quisite to patentability of combination inventions, despite frequent criticism
by patent law commentators."7
Nonetheless, patent law practitioners and commentators expected the new
Federal Circuit to discard the synergism requirement."' That expectation has
been met. Since its formation, the Federal Circuit has decided at least two cases
which addressed the synergism issue. In Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v.
Cumberland Corp.,s0 the court apparently went out of its way to attach the
requirement. The lower court's holding of patent invalidity in that case was
not premised upon a synergism requirement. Nonetheless, the trial court judge
had stated that "[t]here is no synergistic result from the combination of elements,
a result which is more than the sum of the pre-existing elements." The Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding and pointed out that consideration
of synergism is an error, although in this case not a reversible error. The court
stated:
In determining patentability, we are guided, as we must be guided, by
the statute. A requirement that an invention reflect "synergism" or achieve
a "synergistic result," before it may be held patentable appears nowhere
in the statute. The test of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as the statute
makes plain, is whether the invention as a whole would have been ob-
vious at the time it was made to one of ordinary skill in the art. References
to synergism as a patentability requirement are, therefore, unnecessary
and confusing (citation omitted).'
Twelve days after Chore-Time, the Federal Circuit again attacked the
synergism requirement in Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp." The trial judge
in that case had employed a synergism test as an alternative to the Graham
"Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23, at 436.
"1425 U.S. 273. The Court stated, "We cannot agree that the combination of these old elements to produce
an abrupt release of water directly on the bar floor from storage tanks or pools can properly be characterized
as synergistic .... " Id. at 283.
"See, e.g., Geriak, Synergism - How Long Will the Malady Linger On?, 1980 PAT. L. ANN. 51 (1980).
"See, e.g., Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23, at 414.
"*713 F.2d 774 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
"Id. at 780.
"1713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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analysis. Again, the Federal Circuit pointed out that this was error, though
not cause for reversal, stating:
A requirement for "synergism" or a "synergistic effect" is nowhere
found in the statute. When present, for example in a chemical case,
synergism may point toward nonobviousness, but its absence has no place
in evaluating the evidence on obviousness. The more objective findings
suggested in Graham, supra, are drawn from the language of the statute
and are fully adequate guides for evaluating the evidence relating to com-
pliance with 35 U.S.C. § 103. [The trial judge] treated synergism as an
alternative consideration. Hence this error of its analytical inclusion is
harmless in view of [the trial judge's] employment of the Graham aids.
The reference to a "combination patent" is equally without support
in the statute. There is no warrant for judicial classification of patents,
whether into "combination" patents and some other unnamed and
undefined class or otherwise. Nor is there warrant for differing treatment
or consideration of patents based on a judicially devised label. Reference
to "combination" patents is, moreover, meaningless. Virtually all patents
are "combination patents," if by that label one intends to describe patents
having claims to inventions formed of a combination of elements. It is
difficult to visualize, at least in the mechanical-structural arts, a "non-
combination" invention, i.e., an invention consisting of a single element.
Such inventions, if they exist, are rare indeed. (citation omitted).8 3
Clearly, the Federal Circuit has squarely addressed the synergism issue.
It has dispensed with the synergism test of "combination patents" in no uncer-
tain terms. Without hesitation the court has put a stop to the resurrection of
judge-made supplemental patentability requirements which the Patent Act of
1952 sought to eradicate. Instead, the court will rely solely upon the statutory
language.
3. Whether "Secondary Considerations" Are Always To Be
Considered When Evaluating Obviousness
In Graham, the Supreme Court established a three-step test to be applied
before reaching a conclusion on the question of obviousness.8 ' The Court also
identified "secondary considerations" to be examined, but did not specify
whether these considerations are necessary parts of the analysis or merely last
resorts to be applied when the three-step analysis is equivocal. District and
appellate court decisions since Graham have gone both ways, apparently allow-
ing judges to employ or ignore the secondary considerations, depending upon
the desired outcome.8" Nonetheless, patent law commentators examined the
holdings of the predecessor courts and predicted that, under the Federal Cir-
"Id. at 1540.
"See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
"See Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23, at 415.
Winter, 1984] COMMENTS
13
O'Hearn: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1984
AKRON LAW REVIEW
cult, these considerations would soon become mandatory."'
The prediction was correct. In Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp.,87 the
Federal Circuit found harmless error in the district court's failure to include
so-called "secondary considerations" in its analysis of obviousness."8 The court
cited Stratoflex" and In re Sernaker" in support of this point. In this regard,
the Stratoflex court stated:
It is jurisprudentially inappropriate to disregard any relevant evidence on
any issue in any case, patent cases included. Thus evidence arising out
of the so-called "secondary considerations" must always when present
be considered en route to a determination of obviousness .... Indeed,
evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative
and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish that an inven-
tion appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not. It
is to be considered as part of all of the evidence, not just when the decision-
maker remains in doubt after reviewing art. 91
As with the synergism test, there is no doubt where the Federal Circuit
stands. The preliminary facts determinable through application of the secon-
dary considerations must always be taken into account before reaching the
ultimate factual determination of obviousness. With this holding, the Federal
Circuit will help inject "uniformity and definiteness" into the patentability issue
by requiring the factfinders in each case to consider the same set of comprehen-
sive factors and articulate the findings on these factors before reaching a deter-
mination on nonobviousness.
4. Whether Obviousness Is A Question Of Law Or Fact
As noted earlier, the nonobvious requirement under Section 103 was regard-
ed by the Graham Court as a codification of the Hotchkiss invention require-
ment for patentability. The Supreme Court routinely treated the presence of
"invention" as a question of fact until its decision in Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.92 Although the majority opinion
in that case did not purport to alter this view, a concurring opinion by Justice
Douglas maintained that the invention requirement was a question of law to
be determined by reference to the patent clause of the Constitution." This view
$6id.
"7714 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
"Id. at 6.
9713 F.2d 1530.
"702 F.2d 989 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
"713 F.2d at 1538-39 (citations omitted).
"-340 U.S. 147 (1950). See, Note, Nonobviousness in Patent Law: A Question of Law or Fact?, 18 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 612, 616 (1977).
"Great A & P Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 154-58 (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Note, supra note
92, at 612; See also Pravel, How Will the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Review the Evidence
in a Patent Infringement Suite?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 32 (1983).
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would allow de novo review of a lower court's "invention" ruling. Following
Great A & P Tea Co., a number of courts began to treat the "invention" re-
quirement as a question of law.94
The Patent Act of 1952 was enacted two years after the Great A. & P.
Tea Co. decision. When construing that Act for the first time in Graham, the
Supreme Court, citing Great A. & P. Tea Co., stated: "While the ultimate
question of patent validity is one of law, . . . the Section 103 condition, which
is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends itself to
several basic factual inquiries." 95 Thus, while the Graham Court apparently
adopted Justice Douglas' concurring opinion view in Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
it remained unclear exactly how the inquiry should be treated and what the
resulting scope of appellate review should be. As a result, circuit courts have
differed on this point. The majority of courts view nonobviousness as a legal
issue involving factual inquiries.
96
This issue is significant to patent litigants because it affects the allocation
of responsibilities between judge and jury in a patent case and because it deter-
mines the scope of judicial review. If nonobviousness is a question of fact,
then a ruling on patent validity in a jury trial will depend solely upon persua-
sion of the jurors. However, if it is a question of law based on factual deter-
minations, then the judge must ultimately oversee the jurors' verdict. 9
Moreover, if nonobviousness is a question of fact, then a jury verdict or judicial
ruling of patent validity can be overturned on review only if it is found to be
unsupported by substantial evidence or clearly erroneous, respectively. If non-
obviousness is a question of law, then it is subject to de novo review on appeal. 98
Given the vast differences in the allowable scope of review, it is not sur-
prising that the new Federal Circuit finds nonobviousness to be a question of
law based upon factual inquiries and thus, fully reviewable. In at least two
recent cases, 99 the Federal Circuit has quoted language from the earlier Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals case of Stevenson v. International Trade
Commission'"0 to the effect that nonobviousness is a legal conclusion based
on factual evidence rather than a factual determination. Under that scheme
the findings of ultimate fact by a trial judge (the usual fact finder in patent suits)
are accepted if not "clearly erroneous" upon the entire record, while the legal
conclusion of obviousness is subject to de novo review based upon these ultimate
"See, e.g., Ekstrom-Carlson & Co. v. Onsrud Mach. Works, Inc., 298 F.2d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962); Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143, 156 (7th Cir. 1960);
Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 195 F.2d 971, 973 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 844 (1952),
cited in Note, supra note 92, at 617 n.40.
'383 U.S. at 17.
"See, Note, supra note 92, at 620 n.56.
"See generally id.
"See Pravel, supra note 93, at 32-33.
"Stratoflex, 713 F.2d 1530; SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n. 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
'612 F.2d 546 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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facts. Apparently the court feels it best to teach by example the appropriate
legal standard of nonobviousness rather than to leave the nonobviousness issue
to the erratic determinations of individual judges and juries as a purely factual
inquiry.' 01 With this holding, the Federal Circuit will help to inject "uniformity
and definiteness" into the patentability issue through its careful oversight of
the case-by-case development mentioned in Graham.
In its treatment of patent law issues relating to Section 103 of the Patent
Act, the Federal Circuit has not disappointed the legal commentators and
forecasters. The court acted quickly to abolish the widely criticized synergism
requirement for "combination" patents. The court aptly observed that these
concepts have no basis in either the statute or critical thought. The court has
also made clear that consideration of all relevant evidence, including the so called
"secondary considerations," is necessary to a determination of "non-
obviousness." Finally, the court has clarified the allocation of the fact-finding
function and the scope of review by its determination that nonobviousness is
a question of law based on findings of fact. The Federal Circuit's holdings
on these issues signals a new era for patent law in which the determination
of patentability will be based solely upon a thoughtful application of the
statutory language. The tradition of judge-made supplemental requirements,
present in most of the years since 1793, has finally been put to rest.
IV. RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES IN CONFLICT
AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
In its relatively brief existence, the Federal Circuit has resolved several
other less dramatic issues in a fashion similar to those mentioned above.
Although less dramatic, the court's holdings on these issues are indicative of
its overall approach to patent law jurisprudence. Two of these issues arise under
Section 102 of the Patent Act which bars patentability of inventions which have
been "in public use or on sale in this country" for more than one year before
the filing of the patent application.'0" This requirement is a specific variation
of the long established "novelty" requirement.
A. Experimental Use - Subjective or Objective Intent?
An exception to the "public use or sale" rule occurs when the sale or use
was conducted for "experimental" purposes. In this regard, the issue previously
in conflict among circuit courts was the probative value of the inventor's sub-
jective intent to a determination of whether a sale or use was experimental.'0 3
The Fifth Circuit has held that determination of experimental use is primarily
a matter of the inventor's intent, while the Ninth Circuit has held subjective
intent of the inventor to be of no probative force when overwhelming extrinsic
"'Compare, Note, supra note 92, at 617, where the author imputes this same motive to Justice Douglas'
dissenting opinion in Great A & P Tea Company which held nonobviousness to be a question of law.
10235 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
"'Goldstein, supra note 67, at 142.
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evidence is to the contrary.' 0 '
Considering that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had addressed
this issue twice in recent years,' adopting the stricter extrinsic evidence stan-
dard on both occasions, it is not surprising in light of the South Corp. pro-
nouncement to find that the Federal Circuit has recently adopted that same
view. In In re Smith, '06 the Federal Circuit recently affirmed a holding of patent
invalidity for public use despite appellant's arguments that the use was purely
experimental. The court stated:
Although the appellants argue that their St. Louis activities were used to
obtain technical data for further technical development of the claimed
invention, the evidence indicates that the activities did not fall within the
experimental use exception. In determining the purpose of the alleged
experimental use, objective evidence indicating a purpose for such testing
and experiment is generally preferred. An inventor's subjective intent is
generally of minimal value.101
B. "Late Claiming" or "New Matter"?
The second confusing issue under Section 102 of the Patent Act which
has been addressed by the Federal Circuit during its brief existence is the "late
claiming" doctrine. This unusual doctrine arose in the Muncie Gear case after
a patent applicant had amended a pending application to include new, broader
claims despite the fact that the newly claimed subject matter had been in public
use for more than one year.'0 8 After the patent office issued a patent including
the broader claims, the patent's validity was challenged. The court held that
the amended claims were statutorily barred by Section 102 to the extent that
they included subject matter which had been in public use for over one year.
This doctrine has come under attack as nothing more than a "new matter"
problem,' 9 to be dealth with under the statutory provision which prohibits
certain application amendments that broaden the scope of the claimed inven-
tion. However, the Federal Circuit's predecessors were in conflict regarding
the issue."0° The Court of Claims appears to have largely accepted the legitimacy
of the "late claiming" doctrine, while the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in Westphal v. Fawzi' construed a situation similar to Muncie Gear to be
,"'Id.
"'Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23, at 413.
"'6714 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
'"Id. at 1135 (citing Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1973); Cf In Re
Theis, 610 F.2d 786 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
'
0
'Muncie Gear Works, Inc. v. Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co., 315 U.S. 759 (1942).
'0135 U.S.C. § 132 (1976) provides in part: "No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure
of the invention."
"'See, Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23, at 424. The predecessor court conflict is demonstrated
by Westphal vs. Fawzi, 666 F.2d 575 (C.C.P.A. 1981) and Pratt & Whitney, 345 F.2d 838 (Ct. CI. 1965).
"'Westphal, 666 F.2d at 577.
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a "new matter" issue."12
The Westphal court did not consider Muncie Gear to stand for a legal
proposition distinct from the statutory "new matter" principle. Language in
the recent Federal Circuit case of Correge v. Murphy"3 suggests that the
statutory, "new matter" mode of analysis will now prevail. Citing the Westphal
case, the Federal Circuit stated in Correge: "Correge [the challenger of the
patent's validity], has not argued and there is no evidence to support the posi-
tion that the broadened claims were not supported by the application as original-
ly filed. In light of the sufficiency of the disclosure, Correge cannot raise any
so-called 'late claiming' issue. "I" Taken in context, this language and the citation
to Westphal suggest that the judge-made "late-claiming" language of
Muncie Gear will be interpreted by the Federal Circuit as synonymous with
the statutory "new matter" principle.
C. Fraud on the Patent Office - "Materiality, " Objective or Subjective?
The last of the major issues in conflict among the circuit courts which
has been addressed by the Federal Circuit involves fraud. Under patent common
law, a showing by substantial evidence that the patentee practiced fraud upon
the patent office by failing to reveal pertinent prior art is a defense to an infringe-
ment suite."I5 Such a showing can result in the patent's being held invalid.
On this issue, there has been conflict over whether the test for materiality of
the withheld information is a subjective or objective "but for" test. As with
the circuit courts, the predecessor courts to the Federal Circuit adopted opposing
views on this issue. Cases decided by the Court of Claims in the mid-1970's
adopted the "objective but for" test, which holds that a misrepresentation is
material if and only if a patent would not properly have issued from the patent
office but for the misrepresentation." I6 In 1979 the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held that the "subjective but for" standard was appropriate.' '" This
standard examines the actual position taken by the applicant and patent ex-
aminer during the patent application process. Materiality is found if the sub-
ject patent would not have issued from the patent office, given the actual position
of the patent examiner, but for the misrepresentation.
While the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not spoken un-
equivocally on this issue, it appears that the subjective standard of the former
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals will prevail. In Orthopedic Equipment
Company, Inc. vs. All Orthopedic Applicances, Inc., ' the Federal Circuit
upheld a district court ruling that no fraud had been conducted by the patentee.
II2Id.
.'705 F.2d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
"'Id. at 1329 n.4.
"'See, e.g., Square Liner 3600, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 374 (8th Cir. 1982).
"'Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23, at 425.
".'Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
"'707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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The court observed that there was no finding of intent and further noted that
"the nondisclosure was not found to be material; rather, the district court found
that the examiner assigned to prosecution of the patent-in-suit independently
ascertained the existence of the undisclosed prior art."III This language and
the language from cases cited in Orthopedic Equipment strongly suggest that
a standard similar to the "subjective but for" test will emerge under the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
V. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE PATENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Based upon the six issues examined above and the history of United States
patent statutes before and after the 1952 Patent Act, some general conclusions
can be drawn regarding the new patent law era ushered in by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
On the issues relating to patentability, the Federal Circuit is clearly more
inclined to adhere to the language of the patent statutes than some other federal
courts have been. This is evident in the court's early opinions which make a
point of correcting district court language about "combination patents" or
",synergism."1 0 The Federal Circuit apparently perceives the central question
of patent validity to be whether the invention is patentable under the statutes
as enacted by Congress in 1952. The Court eschews pejorative language regar-
ding "patent monopolies" and the like, which serves only to distract from the
statutory analysis.'' The Court apparently feels that the economic trade-offs
of the patent system have been established by Congress and are irrelevant to
a judicial inquiry into an invention's patentability under the present statutes.
On issues not directly related to patentability which were in conflict among
the circuits, the Federal Circuit tends toward views which inject greater stability
and rationality into the patent laws - objectives underlying both the Patent
Act of 1952 and, perhaps, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. This
tendency is evidenced by the court's holdings that the "late claiming doctrine"
is simply a statutory "new matter" problem and that determination of
"experimental use" should turn on extrinsic rather than subjective evidence. 22
Where possible, the court would apparently prefer to base its judgments upon
the conceptual framework provided by the statute and upon the most objec-
tive evidence available.
1"Id. at 1383-84.
"'See, supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
"'See, e.g., Carl Schenk, A. G. v. Norton Corp., 713 F.2d 782 (Fed Cir. 1983) which states:
Norton's brief characterizes Schenk as a "German Monopolist." That denigration, whether inserted
in a vain hope of prejudicing the court or otherwise, has no support in the present record. Disclosure
of an invention found to have revolutionized an industry is but a classic example of the ideal working
of the patent system. If a patentee or licensee enjoys widespread sales, that too is but an example
of the incentive-useful acts promoting element in the patent system.
Id. at 784.
'22See, supra notes 102-133 and accompanying text.
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The source of this differences in patent jurisprudence between the Federal
Circuit and other federal courts in the past, is difficult to identify. Perhaps
it results from the years of exposure to patent law issues by some of the court's
members.' 23 Perhaps the inclination to adhere to the statutory language
represents a personal philosophical position held by a majority of the Federal
Circuit judges regarding the role of the judiciary.' 24 Or perhaps the court's
recognition that it will frequently deal with issues of patent law forces it to
adhere to the most analytically sound and defensible positions available in that
arena. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the court will set a new tone to
patent law.
Numerous other issues in conflict among the circuits have been the sub-
ject of predictions regarding the new direction that the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit may take.'25 While the six issues examined above are not
the only issues to have been resolved by the Federal Circuit during its brief
existence, they are perhaps the most significant. In any event, the record of
predictability of their outcomes lends certainty to future predictions regarding
issues yet unresolved.
The impact of the Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982 on patent law
may well exceed the intentions of its proponents. Not only did it have an
immediate impact on jurisdiction of patent appeals, leading to the intended
resolution of patent law conflicts, but there was also an immediate and equal-
ly dramatic impact upon patenability jurisprudence. This impact on patent law
jurisprudence appears to comport with the legislative purpose of the 1952 Patent
Act. Perhaps now, thirty years after its original enactment, the Patent Act of
1952 will finally realize its intended purpose, via the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982 - to bring "uniformity and definiteness" to patent law,
to provide "a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures" on the re-
quirements for patentability.
TIMOTHY J. O'HEARN
'"See, Rich, supra note 42, at 278, where Judge Rich estimates that in his twenty-two years on the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals that court decided beteween 1700 and 1800 decisions finding inventions
unpatentable.
'4See Rich, supra note 42, at 290, which states:
It is at this point that I have to ask whether section 103 is not an evolution in legal thinking
on just what the third requirement of patentability is. Can we logically go back from nonobviousness
as laid out in 103 to the vague requirement of "invention"? Can we have them both at the same
time? I would ask the judge who feels that nonobviousness is clumsy, either as a word or an idea,
whether it is not less clumsy than "invention." And I ask what right the courts have to substitute
their own ideas of what the requirement is for what Congress has said it is. Is it not their duty
to apply the law as Congress wrote it?
When the courts filled the void in the patent law by adding the requirement to "invention,"
there was no statute on the subject. Since 1952 there has been no void, but a carefully worked
out statutory substitute for the rough-hewn stopgap the courts produeced which the courts themselves
said they could not explain.
Id.
'"'See, e.g., Ninth Judicial Conference, supra note 23; Goldstein, supra note 67.
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